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Abstract
In the field of mechanism design, the revelation principle has been known for
decades. Myerson, Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green gave formal proofs of the rev-
elation principle. However, in this paper, we argue that there are bugs hidden in
their proofs.
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1 Introduction
The revelation principle is well-known in the economic literature. It has several
versions of representations [1–3]. See Page 884, Line 24 [3]: “The implication
of the revelation principle is ... to identify the set of implementable social
choice functions (now in Bayesian Nash equilibrium), we need only identify
those that are truthfully implementable.”
Although the revelation principle is fundamental in the field of mechanism
design, in this paper we will argue that there are bugs in two versions of
proofs. The rest of the paper are organized as follows: In Section 2, we will
analyse the bug in Myerson’s proof [1]. Then, we will point out the bugs in
the proofs given by Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green [3].
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2 The bug in Myerson’s proof
In this section, the notation is referred to Ref. [1]. The bug will be showed by
the following three claims. We use the capital form to emphasize key words.
Claim 1: For each agent i, ti and di are his private information and unknown
to the principal.
Proof : See Page 69, Line 26 [1], “...each type ti in Ti represents a complete
description of all the private information i might have about his environment,
his abilities and his preferences. Each private decision-option di in Di may
represent, for example, a level of effort which agent imight exert in working for
the principal, and which the principal cannot observe or control”. Obviously,
Claim 1 holds.
Claim 2: For each agent i, the two mappings ρi : Ti → Ri and δi :Mi× Ti →
Di are his private information and unknown to the principal.
Proof : See Page 71, Line 19 [1], “In the context of this coordination mechanism
((Ri,Mi)
n
i=1, pi), each agent i controls his choice of reporting strategy in Ri as
a function of his type, and controls his choice of a decision in Di as a function
of his type and his message received. That is, agent i SELECTS a pair of
functions ρi : Ti → Ri and δi : Mi × Ti → Di, such that ρi(ti) would be
agent i’s reporting strategy if i were of type ti, and δi(mi, ti) would be i’s final
decision in Di after he received message mi if his type were ti”.
Generally, each agent i acts independently and self-interestedly when he selects
his participation strategy (ρi, δi). Any agent has incentives to report dishon-
estly and act disobediently whenever doing so is better for him. Thererfore,
the two mappings ρi : Ti → Ri and δi :Mi×Ti → Di must be agent i’s private
information.
Claim 3: There is a bug in Myerson’s proof.
Proof : See Page 74, Line 1 [1], “Given the equilibrium of participation strate-
gies (ρi, δi)
n
i=1, let δ
−1(d, t) be the set of all messages to the agents such that
each agent i would respond by choosing decision di if his type were ti. That
is,
δ−1(d, t) = {m|δi(mi, ti) = di, for all i}.”
It is implicit WHO IS ABLE to calculate δ−1(d, t) for any arbitrarily given d
and t. We emphasize the ability to do the calculation because anybody who
wants to calculate δ−1(d, t) must be able to get all necessary data. As discussed
in Claim 2, the mapping δi is private information of agent i and unknown to
the principal. It is impossible for the principal to calculate δ−1(d, t) when he
is given some d ∈ D and t ∈ T .
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See Page 74, Line 5 [1], “Then, define pi∗ : D × T → R so that
pi∗(d|t) = ∑
m∈δ−1(d,t)
pi(d0,m|ρ1(t1), · · · , ρn(tn)).
pi∗ is the direct coordination mechanism which simulates the overall effect of
the original mechanism with the given participation strategies”.
It is also implicit WHO IS ABLE to calculate ρ1(t1), · · · , ρn(tn) for some given
t1, · · · , tn. As discussed in Claim 2, the mapping ρi is private information
of agent i and unknown to the principal. Therefore, although in Bayesian
Nash equilibrium, each agent i has incentives to truthfully report ρi(ti) to
the principal if his type is ti, it is unreasonable to assume that each agent i
has incentives to TRUTHFULLY report ρi(tˆi) to the principal for all possible
tˆi ∈ Ti, tˆi 6= ti when his type is ti. Hence, it is impossible for the principal to
calculate ρ1(t1), · · · , ρn(tn) for some given t1, · · · , tn.
To sum up, the principal cannot calculate δ−1(d, t) or ρ1(t1), · · · , ρn(tn). Con-
sequently, the principal cannot calculate pi∗. In Page 6, Line 24 [2], Myerson
assumed a virtual person (named mediator) to calculate pi∗: “The assumption
that perfectly trustworthy mediators are available is essential to the mathe-
matical simplicity of the incentive-compatible set”. Therefore, pi∗ can be calcu-
lated only by the assumed mediator, NOT BY THE PRINCIPAL. However,
in Page 73, Proposition 2 [1], Myerson said: “... there exists an incentive-
compatible direct mechanism pi∗ in which the PRINCIPAL gets the same
expected utility...”.
That’s the bug!
3 The bugs in the proofs by Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green
In this section, the notation follows from Ref. [3].
3.1 The revelation principle for Bayesian Nash equilibrium
To derive Eq (23.D.3), the authors replace sˆi in Eq (23.D.2) by s
∗
i (θˆi) (for all
θˆi ∈ Θi). Since Eq (23.D.2) holds for all sˆi ∈ Si, it looks reasonable to do so
at first sight.
As we have pointed out in Section 2, for each agent i ∈ I, his strategy (here
s∗i ) is private information. Therefore, although in Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
for all i and all θi ∈ Θi, agent i has incentives to truthfully report s∗i (θi) to the
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principal when agent i’s type is θi (See Eq (23.D.2)), it cannot be deduced that
each agent i has incentives to TRUTHFULLY report s∗i (θˆi) (for all θˆi ∈ Θi,
θˆi 6= θi) to the principal given that his type is θi. Indeed, for all i, the true
value of s∗i (θˆi) (for all θˆi ∈ Θi, θˆi 6= θi) is NOT AVAILABLE to the principal.
In Page 884, Line 20 [3], the authors assume a mediator:“ ... if we introduce
a mediator who says ‘Tell me your type, θi, and I will play s
∗
i (θi) for you,’
each agent will find truth telling to be an optimal strategy given that all other
agents tell the truth. That is, truth telling will be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of this direct revelation game.” Therefore, the item g(s∗i (θˆi), s
∗
−i(θ−i)) in the
right part of Eq (23.D.3) can be calculated only by the assumed mediator,
NOT BY THE PRINCIPAL.
However, according to Definition 23.B.1 (Page 859, [3]), the social choice func-
tion f : Θ1×· · ·×ΘI → X is specified by the principal, not by some assumed
mediator. Hence, the item f(θˆi, θ−i) in the right part of Eq (23.D.4) can be cal-
culated by the PRINCIPAL. To sum up, it is impossible to derive Eq (23.D.4)
from Eq (23.D.3). That’s the bug!
3.2 The revelation principle for dominant strategies
To derive Eq (23.C.5), the authors substitute s∗i (θˆi), s
∗
−i(θ−i) for sˆi, s−i in Eq
(23.C.4) respectively. Since Eq (23.C.4) holds for all sˆi ∈ Si and all s−i ∈ S−i,
it looks reasonable to do so at first sight.
As we have pointed out, for each agent i ∈ I, his strategy s∗i is private infor-
mation. Therefore, although for all i and all θi ∈ Θi, agent i has incentives to
truthfully report s∗i (θi) to the principal when his type is θi (See Eq (23.C.4)),
it cannot be deduced that each agent i has incentives to TRUTHFULLY re-
port s∗i (θˆi) (for all θˆi ∈ Θi, θˆi 6= θi) to the principal given that his type is
θi. Similar to the discussion in Section 3.1, the item g(s
∗
i (θˆi), s
∗
−i(θ−i)) in the
right part of Eq (23.C.5) CANNOT be calculated by the principal.
However, since the social choice function f is specified by the principal, the
item f(θˆi, θ−i) (for all θˆi ∈ Θi and all θ−i ∈ Θ−i) in the right part of Eq
(23.C.3) CAN be calculated by the principal. To sum up, it is impossible to
derive Eq (23.C.3) from Eq (23.C.5). That’s the bug!
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